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POPULAR CRIME AND POPULIST INVESTIGATION: THE CSI 




The worldwide success of CSI: Crime Scene Investigation (CBS, 2000-2015) has 
attracted a number of publications which aim to understand the series’ 
popularity (Allen 2007, Byers and Johnson 2009, Cohan 2008, Kompare 
2010). As a defining US series of the 2000s which had a significant impact on 
the representation of crime on television, it opens up several avenues of 
investigation, and I am here particularly interested in understanding CSI as 
paradigmatic for the ways the US television industries have come to engage 
with their audience. Television in the United States changed dramatically 
from the 1970s onwards when a combination of regulation—the FinSyn 
Rules (1972)—and a development in delivery technologies—in particular 
cable— brought a sense of economic crisis to the until then burgeoning 
industry. As John T. Caldwell (1995, 5) chronicles, this economic crisis, 
combined with changes in programming practices, the industry’s mode of 
production, and audience expectations affected the look of US television, but 
also had ideological implications. Caldwell emphasizes that the 1980s’ 
“televisuality” was a historically situated effect, though much of what he 
describes continues well beyond the decade, including the sense of crisis. 
Indeed, the US television industries continue to experience similar issues as 
they did in the 1980s, particularly as a result of audience fragmentation, which 
in the era of digitization, if anything, has become more exacerbated. My 
interest in CSI, then, is driven by the wish to understand how this sense of 
crisis has affected the relationship between the industry and its audience, and 
in particular how the attempts by the industry to harness popularity through 
merchandising and franchising has led to the creation of additional texts that 
engage the audience in particular ways. 
CSI became crucial for CBS after the network executives realized its 
popularity with audiences. CBS originally understood the series to be a high 
risk production as the show was not driven by big stars and had been created 
by an unknown writer, Anthony E. Zuiker. Moreover, Disney’s Touchstone 
Pictures, who was originally listed as coproducer, pulled out of the deal and 
was replaced by the Canadian owned Alliance Atlantic (Cohan 2008, 1–3). 
But the series garnered a loyal audience, and was strong enough to help CBS 
overtake NBC in the particularly lucrative Thursday primetime slot (Cohan 
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2008, 3). Eventually, the franchise was considered to be the most successful 
programme in the world (Reuters 2006) as it garnered sizeable audiences in 
some of the world’s largest television markets, including Germany. For CBS, 
then, the series was crucial in helping to return the network to the top of the 
Nielsen ratings, which had positive financial implications. As a result, CBS 
wasted little time and commissioned two further series—CSI: Miami (CBS 
2002–2012) and CSI: NY (CBS 2004–2013)—as well as creating a wide range 
of merchandise, including DVDs, TShirts, novels, cups, video games, board 
games, baseball caps etc. 
In the following, I want to analyse one of these extensions, namely the 
Facebook game: CSI: Crime City. As an extension of the brand, the game 
draws on key elements of the series and plays them through for the audience 
that engages with it. This chapter attempts to unravel how, in offering the 
fans something extra, the producers define their relationship with the fans, 
and more importantly, the fans’ relationship with the series in particular ways 
that is ultimately unsuccessful as is evidenced in the rather tepid reactions of 
the fans to the game. In order to understand the resulting dissatisfaction 
amongst fans, the article will draw on a number of theoretical frameworks, 
including literature on branding, new media, and Ernesto Laclau’s (2005) 
discussion of populism. I draw on Laclau’s work in particular in order to 
provide a counterbalance to the current debates on new media, participation 
and audiences which tend to be split into two mutually exclusive camps. On 
the one hand several scholars (see amongst others Turkle 1997, Jenkins 2008) 
celebrate new media for their participatory potential, while on the other hand 
researchers point to the limitations of this participation, particularly as far as 
the impact on the central (programme) text is concerned (Carpentier 2011). 
Although Carpentier’s work attempts to grapple with the complexities of 
possibilities in terms of audience engagement by drawing up a gradation of 
participation, his model cannot fully explain the intricacies of mutual 
interdependence that exists between producers and audiences. Laclau’s 
model of populism, although it was developed to understand political 
populism, is useful in this context. The article will largely be theoretical, but 
will draw on textual analysis (Creeber 2006) and netnography (Kozinets 2006) 
in order to provide some evidence. A more fully-fledged empirical study 
needs to be reserved for a different time due to constraints of space. The 
following section then will set up the parameters of the analysis and discuss 
why the Facebook game must be understood as an example of failed 
populism. 
Television, Brands and New Media Extensions 
An increasing number of publications (see ChanOlmsted and Kim 2001, 
Bellamy and Traudt 2000 etc.) respond to the more extensive branding 
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strategies of all industries. Many of these publications approach branding 
purely from the point of view of marketing. Celia Lury (2004), in contrast, 
situates branding within the larger context of communication and argues that 
brands function as media where brand owners connect with brand users to 
define the values incorporated in the brand. Each additional product changes 
the brand, just as the specific take-up of the product—its specific uses by 
audiences—determine its meanings. As a result, brands allow for a two-way 
flow of communication, which allows for the input of users into the meaning 
of the brand. Thus, the specific use of audiences can determine what “CSI” 
comes to stand for: whilst certain parameters will remain unchanged, for 
example its connections to the crime genre, its focus on forensics as means 
of investigation etc., new elements, such as a focus on specific relationships, 
could theoretically be added. However, as Lury (2004) highlights, brand 
owners—i.e. the media companies behind CSI—have little or no interest in 
opening the brand up to audiences, and indeed often create a legal framework 
that ensures that the brand values remain defined by brand owners.  
As Catherine Johnson (2012, 4) indicates, television, through advertising 
and marketing, centrally contributes to the definition and closing down of 
brand qualities and values if these qualities and values belong to products 
other than television. Branding television itself, however, is more 
complicated. Here, two brands emerge which can be relatively easily 
identified: the programme brand and the broadcaster/channel brand. These 
need to intersect and inform each other (Johnson 2007). Thus, CSI’s 
programme brand—of a slick, but generic, if “different” crime drama—
needs to connect to the CBS brand, the Channel 5 brand in the UK, the RTL 
brand in Germany etc. As Paul Rixon (2006) points out, each importing 
broadcaster assimilates (and thereby changes) the programme to fit its own 
needs. In terms of branding, this can involve a complete redefinition of core 
brand values, as Paul Grainge (2009) shows in relation to the assimilation of 
Lost into the UK’s Channel 4 brand strategy. In addition to these two 
intersecting brands, a third brand, namely that of the corporation, impacts on 
the relationship between product, channel and audiences (Johnson 2012). 
This suggests that television brands consist of a group of intersecting 
relations which are largely controlled by television institutions, and not by 
audiences. It also draws attention to the fact that any extension of a brand 
into a different medium (such as a video game console or a social media 
website) will inevitably have to renegotiate the brand values through the 
prism of the new medium brand. 
The emphasis on the role of ownership in the literature on branding 
appears at first glance to be antagonistic to a large number of publications 
investigating the uses of new media. In particular, early scholars of new media 
(e.g. Turkle 1997, Gimmler 2001, Bucy and Gregson 2001) express a deep 
sense of optimism in relation to the participatory potential of new media.  
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Indeed, Antje Gimmler (2001) goes as far as to propose that the internet 
could form a new public sphere which could be used for political deliberation 
and decision making. Jingsi Wu (2011) indicates that in countries such as 
China where there is little space in the political process to make democratic 
decisions, programmes such as Super Girl (Hunan Satellite Television, 2004–
2006, the Chinese, unlicensed adaptation of Pop Idol, ITV, 2001–2003) 
enable viewers to practice democratic models, thus contributing to the 
opening up of China towards democratic ideals. But even in societies which 
understand themselves to be democratic, such as the USA, new media have 
largely been celebrated as a means to democratize the consumption processes 
of traditional media and enable wider participation that feeds back into 
program texts (Jenkins 2008, Gillan 2011, Ross 2008). Thus, brand 
extensions into new media appear to offer the creation of the two-way flow 
of communication between brand owners and users. Indeed, the 
participatory nature of new media, both Ross (2008) and Jenkins (2008) 
argue, enables better feedback loops which allow for the incorporation of 
audience ideas into program texts.  
The literature that celebrates new media as a space of participation and 
interaction, however, often subscribes to technologically deterministic views 
and has been met by a similar if not larger number of publications that 
express concern about the participatory potential of new media. For example, 
Andy Bennett (1999) highlights that rather than organizing a coherent, united 
public sphere, the internet helps to organize us into tribes that congregate as 
a result of shared taste cultures. These tribes can be international, but are 
rarely political in nature. Natalie Fenton (2012) goes further by drawing 
attention to the fact that the move to taste cultural tribes actually de-
democratizes us, as it distracts us from the business of politics. Moreover, 
these publications criticize the literature which celebrates the potential of new 
media as indicative of a wider discourse around new media where the 
possibilities of the technologies overshadow understandings of their use 
(McFarlane and Thornham 2013), or perhaps more importantly, where these 
possibilities overshadow actual change (Kember and Zlyinska 2012). On a 
more fundamental level, however, several publications (Carpentier 2011, 
Ziegfeld 1989) highlight that interaction—including clicking or liking—is 
often misunderstood as participation. Acts such as clicking actually only 
facilitate linear, or even nonlinear narratives on the web: “if you want to find 
out more, click here.” In other words, clicking is comparable to choosing a 
particular channel on television. Liking, on the other hand, seems to offer a 
participatory element as what we do here is vote. But there are two issues 
with that. As Fenton (2012) rightly highlights, voting is often restricted to 
areas of entertainment (baby or cat videos on YouTube, The XFactor (ITV 
since 2004), Big Brother (Veronica, 1999–2000) or I’m a Celebrity… Get me 
out of Here (ITV, since 2002) on television). But on the other hand, such 
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forms of participation can be understood as minimalist (Carpentier 2011): 
they give an indication of personal preferences but rarely have a true impact 
on the text. Considering that we supposedly “decide” the outcomes of 
programs such as The XFactor, this might seem counterintuitive. However, 
these programs channel participation in ways that are predictable and 
basically only determine the name of the winner—but not the structure of 
the program itself (Carpentier 2011). In other words, the creative input of 
audiences is non-existent.  
Much of this is due to how the business is now regimented—even if it 
has become increasingly deregulated (Johnson 2012). As Jody Smith 
(multiplatform commissioning editor for comedy and entertainment for 
Channel 4) said at the 2013 Salford Media Festival, within a commercial 
system, where money is necessarily being made from creative ideas, using 
material generated by audiences is a legal nightmare: the question becomes 
who owns intellectual property. Of course, this is particularly important to 
British producers who have made an art out of selling ideas internationally in 
format bibles (Esser 2009, 2013), but it also applies to the US context: whilst 
the sale of formats has become more important in that country too, the sale 
of completed episodes creates a similar problem in terms of intellectual 
property because the sale of finished material across national borders 
nevertheless requires the stipulation of licenses for sales across the world in 
each participant’s contract which is impossible to do if the participants are 
not known well in advance. All in all then, we have to approach the 
participatory potential of new media with a lot of critical analysis. As 
Carpentier (2011, 271) highlights, media technologies are embedded in 
organizational, social and cultural structures which determine how they are 
used. Technologies cannot be understood as neutral, then, because they are 
being used—also by media corporations. 
In the following, however, my aim is to complicate both positions. I want 
to indicate that the extension of brands into the online world does not 
necessarily have to imply a closing down of brand values and qualities, even 
if, in the case of CSI: Crime City it does. This requires first a more detailed 
understanding of the populist and its application to media use. 
The Concept of the Populist 
Laclau’s concept of the populist was developed in order to complicate the 
reductive debates on populism in politics. Laclau emphasizes that his aim is 
to highlight the similarities in different populist projects—not just right-wing 
ones—in order to understand the appeal of populism on the one hand and 
their failure on the other. Drawing on several apparently unconnected areas 
of theory, including linguistics, and in particular semiotics, and Freudian and 
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Lacanian psychoanalyses, he develops a complex theory that recognizes the 
role of affect as well as equivalence chains. 
Unlike other writers on populism, the smallest unit he assesses is not “the 
people” but that of social demand. Indeed, he argues, that it is the articulation 
of a specific social demand that is shared by a number of groups that helps 
to constitute “the people.” “The people,” then, is not a preexisting unit, but 
one that needs to be constructed from a number of differentiated, but 
equivalent demands. This has several effects: first, “the people” is defined by 
its relation to a lack in society. Thus, although it at first seems focused on 
“the plebs,” the excluded, the populist needs to reframe this lack to include, 
and construct, “the populus,” the people as a whole. But Laclau goes even 
further by highlighting that “the plebs” as a partiality already includes the 
construction of the universal, and thus inevitably includes “the populus” 
which becomes apparent when the populist, through a series of social 
demands, constructs the people as a whole. And second, by doing this, the 
populist relies on a heterogeneous understanding of society, but at the same 
time constructs a hegemony. Such a hegemony is created by developing a 
series of equivalences that are unified through one identified social demand 
which is expressed as a general and universal lack in society. Third, the 
populist needs to use an empty signifier in order to incorporate all these 
heterogeneous demands. Fourth, it often relies on a charismatic leader or 
centre who comes to signify these demands and becomes the empty signifier. 
The advantage of Laclau’s definition of the populist is that he recognizes 
the process of constructing the social group, “the people,” through the 
experience of identification of what he calls “populist reason”: the moment 
when a number of social demands are converted into a series of equivalences 
that are unified through an empty signifier. Put simply, it’s the populist that 
constructs the group, not the other way round. This has several benefits for 
this project: first, it does not rely on an assumed opposition between media 
institutions and audiences; second, it recognizes that the (assumed, and 
articulated) audience is actually constructed from a number of audiences; 
third, it nevertheless allows for a recognition of issues of power and 
hierarchies; and fourth, it emphasizes process and recognizes that these 
power relations can change and are more complex than a simple opposition. 
In addition, Laclau’s model allows media scholars to return the debates from 
the emphasis on consumptive behaviour (and commercial imperatives) to 
that of cultural needs.1 
                                                          
1 The implications of that are of course that such a model allows us to work against the 
neoliberal conviction that a commercial system in which audiences show what they want by 
how they behave is best. Thus, giving them more of what they are already watching seems a 
logical step. Instead, it recognizes that audiences’ needs are constantly changing and are diverse 
and differentiated. This means cultural output, in order to cover those needs must be diverse 
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How might this look for the CSI franchise? The popularity of CSI does 
not simply stem from one identifiable consumptive behavior, but rather rests 
on a number of different (but equivalent) cultural needs which have until 
then been unfulfilled. Importantly, these needs might not have been 
conscious or articulated, but rather become clear through the process of 
identification as a “fan of CSI.” In other words, there were several things 
lacking or missing in the existing television output that CSI was able to fulfil. 
These equivalent needs can be subsumed under the larger cultural demand 
for “more CSI” and cover, amongst others, the demand for more “pure” 
crime drama (without emphasis on the relationship between detectives), the 
demand for more visually stunning TV drama, the demand for more of 
William Petersen or Marg Helgenberger or any of the other cast, the demand 
for more forensic-based crime drama, the demand for crime drama that 
develops its narrative in a particular way, the demand for access to one or 
several audiences (this coming from different institutions involved in 
producing CSI), and the demand for a good career and remuneration (coming 
from any of the crew involved in producing CSI). So already, we see that the 
social group is quite heterogeneous, but brought together as a group by the 
demand for “more CSI” and can perhaps be defined as a group of people 
who care about the program.2 In order for these demands to be brought 
together, however, an empty signifier is needed—which in this case is “more 
CSI”—and, perhaps more importantly, someone to articulate the empty 
signifier: Laclau’s charismatic leader. In this respect, CSI has had a much 
more difficult task at hand than perhaps some other series, particularly those 
with a clearly defined showrunner, or in older cases, writers, such as Joss 
Whedon for Buffy, the Vampire Slayer (The WB, UPN, 1997–2003), Stephen 
Bochco for any of his work, Russel T. Davies for both Queer as Folk (C4, 
1999–2000) and Doctor Who (BBC One since 2005), Dennis Potter for his 
work, or, in one of the rare cases with a woman at the helm, Ann Biderman 
for SouthLAnd (NBC, 2009, TNT, 2010–2013). But as already indicated, 
Anthony E. Zuiker appeared too inexperienced, though some interviews 
indicate that there was an attempt to establish him as “charismatic leader” for 
a short time, while Jerry Bruckheimer, as producer, was perceived as too 
much focused on mass appeal blockbusters to provide something different 
                                                          
and differentiated. Such an understanding takes us closer to the approach the Annan 
Committee (1977) took in their recommendations for the development of broadcasting. 
2 Such language of “care” is often adopted by institutions within the television industry that 
produce material, particularly when the programme is threatened by cancellation by its 
broadcaster. This was for example noticeable when the news came in that the BBC had decided 
to cancel Ripper Street (BBC 2012–2013 and Amazon from 2014). Thus, Jerome Flynn who 
plays Sergeant Drake emphasized the “shock” that the actors were feeling, and the “wonderful 
job” that the series was (Moss 2013). In this context, we see again how Laclau’s model allows 
us to make sense of the competing institutional forces within the television industries—also 
internationally—which enables television institutions to align themselves with audiences. 
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and identify gaps. For a while it looked as if William Petersen, who not only 
fronted the cast but was also one of the key producers of the series, might 
take on the role, though his departure from the starring role made this more 
difficult. The role of the charismatic leader, therefore, remained unoccupied, 
which implied that the articulation of what “more CSI” meant was largely left 
in the hands of the producing and commissioning institutions (including 
CBS, but also Alliance Atlantis, RTL in Germany etc.) who have no other 
means of communicating this articulation than through, on the one hand, 
branding, and on the other, brand extensions and merchandising. It is for this 
reason, as I will show, that CSI’s attempts to create a universe for the fans 
that they experienced as satisfying were largely unsuccessful. The following 
provides a largely theoretical discussion of the issues at hand, though some 
(limited) evidence drawn from internet ethnography3 will provide further 
back up.  
Watching CSI 
CSI is both a crime narrative and a broadcast series which follows a number 
of recognizable conventions, including its episodic form (Creeber 2004), its 
overreliance on stories about murder (Boyle 2005) and its emphasis on a 
narrative structure of equilibrium, disruption, working through which leads 
to the solution and the reestablishment of the initial equilibrium in its 
amended form (Todorov 1977). Despite these well-established generic 
conventions, or perhaps because of them, the television series provides many 
spaces for the audience to intersect and interpret the program along a range 
of negotiated positions (Morley 2000). The following attempts to unravel 
some of the spaces to intersect by highlighting different aspects of the series 
that might be at the center of a viewer’s interpretation.  
One aspect of the series which evidently remains compelling to audiences 
in the US and beyond, as the proliferation of crime narratives on television 
indicates, is its interest in crime. In part, this is the result of crime narratives 
being able to allow audiences to explore moral and ethical issues as Thomas 
Leitch (2002) rightly argues. Julia Kristeva’s (1996) concept of the abject is 
helpful to understand why this is compelling: CSI, even more than other 
crime dramas on television, revolves largely around murder. In part, this is 
connected to the centrality of the body and the process of DNA analysis for 
                                                          
3 I draw in particular on the methodologies discussed by Philip S. Howard (2002) who indicates 
the difference between traditional online ethnography and an examination of online reviews 
of audiences where there is no community into which the “ethnographer” has to negotiate 
entry. Indeed, I largely follow the example of Ann Steiner (2008) who examined the customer 
reviews on online retailer Amazon, which I will do for the TV series, as it allows me to compare 
British, American and German reviews with each other, to emphasize potential cultural 
differences. For the Facebook game, I need to draw on a number of different internet sites 
and rely more heavily on semiprofessional reviews to collect my evidence. 
CRIME AND DETECTION IN CONTEMPORARY CULTURE 
130 
forensics, a relatively new methodology which had become increasingly 
sophisticated (and well known) as a result of the Human Genome Project, 
which got under way in 1990, only 10 years before CSI first aired on CBS. 
But CSI’s focus on the body is also part of its specific aesthetics of affective 
spectacle (Lury 2005) which moves the viewer’s body. With its emphasis on 
gore and bodily fluids, CSI borrows heavily from the horror genre in order 
to emphasize the body as “the ultimate abject” (Kristeva 1996) which 
threatens both social and individual boundaries and hence requires 
exploration in order to be resolved. Crime narratives therefore allow us to 
engage with two key issues relating to our identity: what does it mean to be 
human who is a body that will die and rot away one day? And what does it 
mean to be a human being within the context of a fragile social contract 
which can so easily be disturbed through violence? The investigation plot of 
the series which not only establishes whodunit, but probably more 
importantly—why—allows us to reexamine the workings of this social 
contract and reframe it if necessary. Importantly, the crime narrative allows 
us to question the ethical and moral underpinnings of our social contract, 
draw attention to its weaknesses and hence—potentially—improve it. 
All of this, of course, means that crime narratives are engaging. But they 
also offer a level of semiotic uncertainty (Hall 2000): there are spaces to 
intersect, to interpret and understand the text in line with our social and 
cultural identities. Our previous encounters with crime and television drama 
as well as any other social and cultural experiences furthermore determine 
our hermeneutic horizons (Gadamer 1965) which will influence where the 
interpretative process starts and ends. In many ways, then, this linear, one-
directional medium of broadcasting with its generic boundaries offers a sense 
of interactivity that Marshall McLuhan (1994) described in relation to “cold 
media.” McLuhan’s problematic proposition was based on technologically 
deterministic assumptions about television being low definition (because at 
the time of writing, images were small and resolution low, requiring us to talk 
to each other in order to get the meaning of television images). However, we 
now know enough about audiences, their complex relationships to media, the 
role of their previous experiences to the process of interpretation (Morley 
2000) and indeed the fact that audiences are also constituted socially 
(Thornham 2011, Hills 2002) that we can make a stronger argument for the 
importance of social interaction in our understanding of media content.4 If 
anything, new media have made this more visible (Jenkins 2000, Gillan 2011). 
                                                          
4 And there seems to be a trend back to the emphasis on social interaction, not just by sitting 
around the television together and watching together (which, in the UK, at least, experienced 
somewhat of a renaissance; see BARB 2013), but also via the second screen which is used to 
interact with other audience members who are spatially absent but who nevertheless share and 
interact about the same viewing experience. 
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But CSI is also spectacular—and it engages a deliberate “quality of the 
surface” (Goode 2007) which relies on audiovisual spectacle rather than 
narrative depth. As Tom Gunning (1990) has argued, early cinema similarly 
used such a visual spectacle of making things seen which captured some of 
the spirit and energy of working class culture precisely because it wasn’t 
closed down by narrative. This energy, this synergy, and the semiotic and 
hermeneutic uncertainty, opens audiovisual communication up to a variety 
of audiences, and we can see how CSI draws on elements of this. On the one 
hand, it does present us with a linear narrative which unfolds a fabula—the 
crime narrative (Allan 2007). At the same time, the way it presents us this 
narrative is by drawing on elements of televisuality (Caldwell 1995) and 
flexinarrative (Nelson 1997): the focus is less on presenting causal 
connections between elements of narrative (this leads to that), but to provide 
visual and aural spectacle, and to engage the viewer affectively (Weissmann 
and Boyle 2007). The emphasis on affect also implies an engagement with 
the content that goes beyond signification and hence allows for a sense of 
(embodied) experience. Whilst such an embodied experience might not quite 
have the power of symbolic encounters as imagined by Baudrillard (1993), it 
nevertheless suggests a deeper, more meaningful encounter than has 
traditionally been ascribed to media. Importantly within such an encounter 
also sit quite a few pleasures for audiences: the encounters with the abject 
and with the spectacular move us. It is CSI’s potential for multifaceted 
engagement—from narrative to the spectacular—that constitutes the 
foundations for its ability to be popular. It is important to emphasize that at 
this stage, CSI facilitates popular engagement, but does not close it down in 
order to harness the popular demand (see Laclau 2005). In other words, at 
this stage, the popular is constituted in our engagement with the text and 
remains extremely heterogenous, as the following discussion of viewer 
responses to the first season of CSI: Crime Scene Investigation makes 
evident. These responses were collected from the IMDB website. As it allows 
for the recognition of the country of origin which, in line with Rixon (2006), 
I assume, gives audiences different contexts and hence meanings through 
which they can understand the series. Whilst I appreciate that the posting 
audience on the IMDB is a small, self-selecting minority, and hence not 
representative of the overall audience, the reviews allow me to indicate that 
there are differences in understanding and cultural appreciation between 
different countries which suggests that CSI can satisfy several cultural 
demands. 
The responses from the US range from an unqualified “best shows on 
television,” over an emphasis on the actors, and in particular William 
Petersen, and their ability to engage the audience, to the relationship to the 
Sherlock Holmes narratives of rational, scientific investigation, which is 
perceived as “dead on accurate.” British viewers similarly emphasize 
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character, narrative and the representation of forensics, but there is also more 
evidence of evaluation of the style of the show, the use of music and 
spectacular visuality. Thus, audiences highlight the “stunning visuals,” the 
“ultrahip manipulation of new technology” and “the music of Pete 
Townsend, used to great effect.” There is also a surprising amount of 
criticism for the goriness of scenes which does not stand in the foreground 
of the American reviews. The German reviews are closest to the British ones, 
though what the British audiences seem to experience as problematic gore is 
understood as realistic detail in Germany. In addition, the German reviews 
indicate that the elements of humor, particularly as provided by the character 
of Gil Grissom (“the dry humor of Gil Grissom”), are an additional draw. 
The differences in responses highlights that the cultural needs covered by 
CSI are manifold and rely both on individual and national differences. Whilst 
in the US, CSI fulfils needs to do with actors, character, plot and narrative, 
British viewers are also attune to style—perhaps as a result of the perceived 
lack of similarly over-stylized series on British television. It is very noticeable 
that the aspect of humor plays no part in either the British or the American 
responses, suggesting that this might be either specific to the German 
temperament, or due to the translations of the dubbed German version. All 
in all, it highlights that CSI manages to unite a heterogeneous group of 
demands. 
Playing CSI: Crime City 
Crime City is a game that is available only on Facebook, a social networking 
site that facilitates multiple forms of interaction. At first glance, Facebook 
offers a space of true participation, which Carpentier (2013) defines as the 
interaction and mutual decision making of multiple actors who have the same 
status. However, in the case of a game, which is largely played by a single 
player, with only the occasional boost from other players (here in the form 
of energy from their “coffee cups”), the game rather seems to offer 
“interaction” which is channeled in particular ways by the organizations who 
control it. In that respect the game is another example of forms of 
“connected viewing” that largely aim to create particular forms of 
engagement in order to return power to media companies that perceive to 
have lost this power (Lee and Andrejevic 2014, Steirer 2014, Payne 2014). 
The game is designed as a treasure hunt (Ashby 2010), which means that the 
avatar searches different virtual spaces for “treasure”—here evidence. This is 
done by being propelled to different crime scenes where the avatar 
“searches” tiles by clicking them. Once evidence is found, it is taken to the 
lab, where it will be analyzed through different processes. In order to vary 
the game play, there are several other elements built into the game: the 
searching uses up energy which is only replenished through time or by 
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drinking a coffee which can be gotten by “hopping into” another player’s lab 
(without them realizing, however). The avatar also increasingly moves up the 
ranks and with that comes more energy. Plus, in addition to finding evidence, 
the avatar also finds memorabilia and is given funding boosts which add up 
so that the player can buy new equipment which uses up less energy. In 
addition, the searching of locations is connected to larger crime narratives 
which are told through cutscenes which are, however, not interactive and are 
often lost sight of as the player waits for the energy to replenish. Overall, 
then, the narrative emphasis largely lies on the forensic investigation of crime 
scenes; other aspects such as the crime narrative or the spectacle of the abject 
body appear as less important. This suggests that the specific game format—
but also the control of the powerful organizations (including Facebook, the 
developer UbiSoft, and the license holders of CSI—now CBS)—reduce the 
semiotic uncertainty that made the series popular. This becomes clearer when 
we consider the different aspects of the game contributing to this.  
Crime City is clearly an extension of the CSI brand: it uses familiar imagery 
(including the helicopter shots of Las Vegas), characters and music and other 
aural elements of the series to reconnect the audience to the main brand 
object—the series. As Hazel Grian, interactive media producer, who worked 
amongst others on the multimedia and offline media campaign of Star Trek, 
indicated at a talk at the Salford Media Festival (2013), such extensions are 
usually funded by marketing and hence have to fulfil a certain purpose. Grian 
identified this as a problem, as the product is largely meant to take audiences 
back to the broadcast or film text (see also Lee and Andrejevic 2014) and 
create audience hype around the product, rather than allow for an experience 
that is meaningful in its own right and hence allows audiences to experience 
and create new meanings beyond the main brand object. Of course, these 
extensions are also about creating audience loyalty. Gillan (2011) is still quite 
celebratory in what that means for audiences, i.e. that there are spaces to 
congregate, that there is talk online which in her eyes is evidence of audience 
interaction. But what she fails to discuss is how this interaction has 
increasingly become focused on keeping audiences talking rather than 
offering a space for audiences to suggest ideas—the case of Joss Whedon 
listening to audiences online and expanding the universe was a blip; there is 
now increasing emphasis on harnessing audience interaction for marketing 
purposes (Andrejevic 2008). Whilst in some cases, such as the website 
Television without Pity which Andrejevic (2008) discusses, this does give the 
audience the space to intersect and reframe programs or games in creative 
and subversive ways, in the case of the CSI Facebook game it seems to close 
down meanings. Here, there is practically no space to interact: the player 
hunts for the treasure alone and can only engage with others by sharing their 
promotion, the fact that they have a cup of coffee waiting etc. on their 
timeline. Thus, there are surprisingly few opportunities to interact with others 
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within the social media website. Instead, this particular extension of the brand 
should be understood in line with what Lury (2004) describes as a specific 
variation of the brand which reinforces key elements of it.  
Other variations of the CSI brand, however, seem more open. As Allan 
(2007) shows, the novels present quite a bit of an extension in relation to 
character development, which in the television series remains minimal. While 
the novels do not provide all that much revelation—they are still primarily 
interested in murder cases and their solution—they do offer character insight 
via omniscient narration. The graphic novel, too, Allan argues, presents a 
little extension in relation to character development by means of visual 
innuendo. Finally examining the video game, Allan indicates that the video 
game seems to close down character development. Drawing on Juul (2005), 
he indicates that this is largely because character development is connected 
to a revelation of emotion, and emotions cannot be put into predictable rules 
in a way that video game programming requires. Allan nevertheless argues 
that the video game offers a sense of interactivity which mirrors the guessing 
along of the television viewer and the investigative processes of the CSI team 
themselves. The video game allows for wrong clues to be followed and the 
wrong people to be interviewed, meaning that there are rules programmed 
into the game that complicate the investigation plot and hence lead to (some) 
semiotic uncertainty. Because of the limitations of the Facebook game in 
terms of data memory and space, such following of wrong clues is severely 
limited even if the wrong people are interviewed as suspects. However, this 
is not an option, but automatically built into the Facebook game: as soon as 
the three pieces of evidence are processed, the game automatically takes you 
to the next interview. Thus, the player has little involvement in working out 
what clues actually mean or where they lead to—this is provided 
automatically by the game—rather the player is focused on finding the 
evidence at the crime scene. In addition, the game does not facilitate talk 
about narrative in the same way as television. Whilst much of our broadcast 
consumption is still live which means we are watching at the same time as 
others, and video games are often played together in small groups of friends 
(BARB 2014), the Facebook game is played individually, with very little 
chance that friends play at the same level. Thus, even talk about the game 
becomes focused on how to keep turning tiles for longer by getting more 
energy (as is evidenced by talk on different internet forums). As a result, 
however, there is also less space for the audience to intersect: talk about a 
text’s story allows for the individual to be confronted by different 
interpretations, opening up the understanding of the text and introducing 
further semiotic uncertainty. Here, this is closed down to talk about the text’s 
mechanics. 
But there are other aspects of the game that indicate that instead of 
opening up, the game seems to close down the potential for semiotic and 
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hermeneutic uncertainty which goes beyond the program and connects to the 
medium. Social networking is closely linked to notions of identity, as several 
authors have highlighted (Boyd 2007, Mendelson and Papcharissi 2010 etc.). 
Hogan (2010) suggests that there are two elements to this: on the one hand 
we can interact with other actors in real time when using social media (e.g. 
chatting, instant messaging etc.). In this case, we are actors performing an 
identity. But largely, our identity is formed by us curating elements of our 
lives as our identity: we post status updates, pictures etc. In this case we form 
our identity via artefacts. This, then, can work as a starting point for social 
interaction. In addition, and contrary to earlier belief (Turkle 1997, Jenkins 
2008), social media harness offline networks and transfer them to online 
ones. In other words, the offline network is the primary network, not the 
other way around. The key function of social media for these networks is 
what Ellison et al. (2007) describe as “bridging social capital” which means it 
is a light-touch social capital, rather than a deeper, meaningful one (which 
they, however, found also features on Facebook). It is the same as keeping in 
touch with people or catching up quickly. One of the descriptions used 
“keeping tabs on acquaintances” is perhaps clearest in regards to the depth 
of social engagement.  
How does the above connect to CSI: Crime City? First of all, Facebook 
allows us to express our identity as fans, if we so wish. By liking, uploading a 
picture or posting a video or even just commenting on a program, we curate 
an element of our identity that can spark further engagement with others, 
including comments and potentially chats. Crucially, this is with people that 
we already know and bridges the gap of displacement or temporal absence. 
Thus, we can use television—as in real life—as a means to communicate and 
connect with people we know and build relationships whilst expressing both 
our affective and semiotic experiences of a program. But this does not 
happen in this case: as my own attempts for feedback indicated, the automatic 
Facebook updates that are created are usually ignored by other members of 
the audience because they bear the recognisable mark of marketing and 
advertising. As a result, rather than bridging any gaps, playing Crime City 
actually seems to isolate us from our social networks.  
The critical responses to the game then (largely taken from the Talk CSI 
forum) indicate a sense of frustration with the game. Several respondents 
indicated that “clicking squares isn’t very exciting,” and that by having to wait 
to recharge the energy, they felt that they lost the understanding of the crime 
narrative. As one poster put it succinctly: “My main problem with the game 
is that I spend so much time doing other things waiting for energy to regen 
that by the time I get through the case I’ve forgotten what the thing was 
about in the first place.” This suggests that the crime narrative, which is 
normally central to the enjoyment of this player, gets lost as a result of the 
particular format of the game. This is in line with other Facebook games 
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which similarly limit narrative to such things as world building “rather than 
any kind of linear or branched storyline” (Evans 2015, 567). Instead the 
process of searching and processing is perceived as “boring” and “repetitive” 
(Daniels 2012). The players do like the similarities and “cuteness” of the 
characters to the actors who play them, indicating that the extension of 
character into the game is perceived as a real pay off. But mostly the game 
receives praise when it is compared to other Facebook treasure hunt games 
which are perceived as even more boring and repetitive. The discussion on 
the Talk CSI forum also makes evident that there are real attempts by the 
community to undercut the game in terms of helping each other by sharing 
Facebook details so the other players can be added as friends and work 
equipment and coffees (and thus energy) can be shared. That such 
undercutting is necessary is to do with the specific economics behind games 
such as CSI: Crime City: as Evans (2015) highlights, these kind of games 
exploit gamer impatience by reducing the amount of energy available, forcing 
players to either wait or spend money to get energy boosts. The undercutting 
of such monetization by the fans indicates attempts to subvert the power of 
the media companies, but does not help to create a greater semiotic 
uncertainty for the game.  
Conclusions: CSI: Crime City and the Populist 
Crime City, then, can be understood as a case of failed populism, though not 
all extensions of CSI need to be classed as such. Rather, the Facebook game 
fails, because it reduces the equivalence chain (“more CSI” means more of 
all the different cultural demands listed above) to a too simplistic form 
(“more forensic methodology with a bit of visuals and familiar faces thrown 
in”). If CSI was popular because it allows for a number of experiences and 
pleasures, then Crime City picks up on this popularity, but redefines it for the 
specific needs of the organizations that control the franchise. Within the 
populist imagination of crime, the methodology of investigation is 
foregrounded to the detriment of other pleasures. But this also suggests that 
because these organizations have specific needs (usually to make money), 
they need to exploit popular interest by channelling it in a particular way. This 
means, extensions such as the Facebook game which operates also within the 
limitations of the specific economics of Facebook games (Evans 2015) are 
not driven by opening up semiotic uncertainties and hence facilitate talk, 
which causes significant problems to the populist project. This means that 
although the opportunity for the threeway flow of communication exists—
where producers communicate with audiences via the extension, and 
audiences communicate with each other about the extension and feed their 
talk back to producers—it cannot be taken up because such a model of 
communication would require a greater emphasis on narrative in particular 
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and other aspects of the series, which in the case of the Facebook game 
cannot be offered because of the limitations of games within the social media 
website. Such a threeway flow of communication would involve (first) the 
creation of a semiotically and hermeneutically open artefact which could then 
(second) be curated by a user of Facebook (such as a status update about an 
element of the investigation plot rather than a status update about the 
successfulness of the investigation process). This would require a status 
update about what is happening (which would open up the semiotic world), 
rather than about the promotion of the avatar (which creates a measurable, 
quantifiable artefact). The semiotically open artefact could then invite 
comment and feedback which could flow back (third) into the game 
experience (as a hermeneutic horizon).  
But there is something much more fundamental going on here, that needs 
to be addressed and that the emphasis on brand extensions alone cannot 
actually unravel. For this we have to return to Laclau’s concept of the 
populist. If the group is only constituted in the process of creating an 
equivalence chain out of a series of different cultural demands, then the brand 
extensions (which as discussed above are central to the articulation of the 
empty signifier “more CSI”) also create a specific kind of group: those 
invested enough to engage with such extensions, in other words, fans. Rather 
than identifying audiences as viewers or consumers of a programme, 
audiences, then, are addressed as a group who want more and who are 
emotionally invested, as well as increasingly becoming experts (Hills 2002). 
There are three implications to this: first, it mainstreams fandom. As Hills 
(2006) highlights the difference between consumers of commercial content 
and “authentic” fans is in part constructed. Nevertheless, as his case of fans 
of Lord of the Rings (Peter Jackson, 2001, 2002, 2003) makes evident, there 
is a significant struggle involved by “authentic” fans to rescue their object of 
interest from the commercial machine. Hills, however, still operates with an 
opposition between fans and normal consumers. My point, however, is that 
the industry increasingly tries to break down that boundary and address us all 
as fans. This, as the discussion here makes evident, is an outcome of the new 
economic model (Lury 2004, Johnson 2007, 2012). Second, it highlights the 
mutual interdependence between the media institutions and the audience 
they address as fans: media institutions need to be able to draw on an 
equivalence chain to articulate the populist. While the power lies with the 
media institutions who are able to articulate the empty signifier, they would 
nevertheless be powerless without being able to draw on the heterogeneous 
cultural demands arising from “the fans.” And third, it highlights that the 
terms of engagement have changed. If we are addressed as fans, then we are 
much more emotionally invested in a programme than if we are viewers. 
Laclau indicates this by emphasizing the role of affect in the process of 
populist reason (2005, 115). This has, of course, been much discussed before: 
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the role of the creation of “buzz” (Fernando 2004). Of course this “buzz” is 
not simply constructed through the marketing, but harnesses some real and 
existing cultural needs of the audience. But what the focus on Laclau allows 
us to see is that such a buzz can only remain successful as long as it draws 
and combines the heterogeneous demands and that it will ultimately fail if it 
becomes too one dimensional—as the case of the Facebook game indicates. 
Most of all, however, Laclau’s concept of the populist allows us to emphasize 
the complex process of negotiation that exists between media organizations 
and viewers in which brand extensions both create a unified group and hence 
define the media organization’s dependence on the group, as well as creating 
a hegemony that rarely manages to honour the disparate needs and demands 
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